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1974 DEVELOPMENTS IN WELFARE LAW-
THE SUPPLEMENTAL SECURITY
INCOME PROGRAM
On January 1, 1974, the Supplemental Security Income (SSI)
program' replaced the former federal-state categorical programs
of aid to the aged, blind, and permanently and totally disabled in
the fifty states and the District of Columbia2 for the purpose of
ensuring a minimum level of income for all eligible individuals. 3
Conceptually, the operational structure of the program is relatively
straightforward. 4 The federal component of SSI is administered by
the Social Security Administration and financed through general
funds from the United States Treasury.5 Uniform nationwide
eligibility standards 6 and a federal income "'floor" are designed to
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-85 (Supp. III, 1973).
2The former state-administered grant-in-aid programs of Old Age Assistance, Aid to
the Blind, and Aid to the Permanently and Totally Disabled are to continue in Guam, Puerto
Rico, and the Virgin Islands. 42 U.S.C. § 301 nt. (Supp. III, 1973).
3 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (Supp. 1l, 1973); 39 Fed. Reg. 28,626 (1974). HEW regulations, in
addition to codifying the purpose of SSI, espouse six basic principles that are to underlie the
program:
(a) Objective tests. The law provides that payments are to be made to aged, blind,
and disabled people who have income and resources below specified amounts. This
provides objective measurable standards for determining each person's benefits.
(b) Legal right to payments. A person's rights to supplemental security income pay-
ments... [is] dearly defined in the law. The area of administrative discretion is
thus limited. . . . [But see notes 21-92 and accompanying text infra.]
(c) Protection of personal dignity. Under the Federal program, payments are made
under conditions that are as protective of people's dignity as possible. No restric-
tions, implied or otherwise, are placed on how recipients spend the Federal
payments.
(d) Nationwide unformity of standards. The eligibility requirements and the Federal
minimum income level are identical throughout the 50 States and the District of
Columbia. This provides assurance of a minimum income base on which States may
build supplementary payments.
(e) Incentives to work and opportunities for rehabilitation. Payment amounts are not
reduced dollar-for-dollar for work income but some of an applicant's income is
counted toward the eligibility limit. Thus, recipients are encouraged to work if they
can ....
(f) State supplementation and Medicaid determinations.
39 Fed. Reg. 28,626 (1974).
4 For a detailed description of the SSI progtam in its entirety, see 58 CORNELL L. REv.
803 (1973); Developments in Wefare Law-1973, 59 CORNELL L. REv. 859, 880 (1974).
5 39 Fed. Reg. 28,626 (1974).
6 42 U.S.C. §§ 1381-83 (Supp. 1II, 1973).
Id. As of July 1, 1974, the federal income "floor" for an eligible individual was $146
per month and $219 per month for an eligible couple. Id. § 1382(b). This floor will begin to
rise as the automatic cost-of-living increases embodied in Public Law 93-368 (Act of Aug.7,
1974, Pub. L. No. 93-368, § 6(b), 88 Stat. 422) take effect. See notes 132-36 and accompany-
ing text infra. For a general discussion of the eligibility criteria and benefit levels under the
SSI program, see 59 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 4, at 881-87.
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provide more equitable treatment of aged, blind, and disabled
persons with limited income and resources. 8 In many cases, pay-
ments supplement the basic Social Security benefits. 9 In addition,
states may supplement this payment for certain categories of ben-
eficiaries1" and must supplement it for those persons who would
otherwise be adversely affected by the transition.' Federal ad-
ministration of a state's supplemental program is made available in
such a manner as to provide a strong economic incentive for states
to choose this option 2 and, in fact, during 1974 a majority of states
have done so.1
3
8 For a critique of the inequitable treatment that existed under the former adult
categorical assistance programs, see PRESIrENT'S COMM'N ON INCOME MAINTENANCE PRO-
GRAMS, PovERTY AMID PLENTY: THE AMERICAN PARADOX 46-50 (1969). See also Dandridge v.
Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970); Musgrave, Heller &
Peterson, Cost Effectiveness of Alternative Income Maintenance Schemes, 23 NAT'L TAx J. 140
(1970).
' For example, early data on aged SSI recipients suggests that of the 3.8 million aged
persons (65 years of age or over) wbo are estimated to be eligible for an SSI payment, 2.7
million, or about 71%, are Social Security beneficiaries. Staples, Supplemental Security Income:
The Aged Eligible, 36 Soc. SEC. BULL., July 1973, at 32-34. With this large SSI-Social Security
overlap, the Social Security Administration was naturally chosen to administer the new
program. For other advantages associated with Social Security administration of the pro-
gram, see H.R. REP. No. 231, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 157-58 (1971) [hereinafter cited as HOUSE
REPORT]; Hearings on the Social Security Amendments of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
92d Cong., 1st Sess., at 120-21 (1971) (testimony of E. Richardson, Secretary, HEW).
Even though most persons eligible for SSI are Social Security beneficiaries, non-
beneficiaries depend more heavily on SSI for their basic income protection. For example,
while Social Security beneficiaries who receive a federal SSI payment are estimated to
represent 71% of eligible persons, they receive only 49% of the SSI outlays. Non-
beneficiaries, on the other hand, representing only 29% of eligible persons, receive 51% of the
outlays. See Staples, supra at 34. One would therefore expect that any administrative delays in
reaching these nonbeneficiaries during a transition period could have disastrous consequences.
For the actual results see notes 20-52 and accompanying text infra.
10 42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. l11, 1973). See generally Blong & Thorkelson, State
Supplementation of Benefits Under the Supplemental Securitj Income (SSI) Program, 6 CLEARING-
HOUSE REv. 653 (1973).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1382 nt. (Supp. III, 1973) (originally enacted as Act of Dec. 30, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 10, 87 Stat. 957, amending Act of July 9, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, §
212, 87 Stat. 155). To use the vernacular, these persons have been "grandfathered" into the
program. They consist of individuals for whom the new federal benefit levels would have
resulted in payments reduced from those previously received under the state programs.
1 mhe state may enter into an agreement with HEW whereby the Social Security
Administration will administer the state-financed supplementary program. The
state receives a distinct financial benefit from opting for the federally administered
program because all administrative costs are borne by the federal government,
leaving the state with only the expense of the actual benefits paid. A state which
entered into such an agreement would also benefit from the 1972 Act's "hold
harmless" clause whicb provides that state supplementation payments "shall not
exceed the non-Federal share of expenditures as aid or assistance for quarters in the
calendar year 1972."
59 CORNELL L. REv., supra note 4, at 889. It should be noted, however, that there is a
statutory provision which prevents a state from giving too generous optional benefits while
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Because SSI represents the first major step taken by the
federal government in the area of welfare reform, 14 its early
development will have significance far beyond the confines of its
stated purpose.' 5 For example, future efforts to overhaul the
family assistance programs are likely to follow many of the same
administrative principles embodied in SSI.1 6 One would therefore
the federal government is picking up the bill. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382e nt. (Supp. III, 1973).
Only to the extent that a state's payments do not, on the average, exceed the state's "adjusted
payment level," will it be able to take advantage of the "hold barmless" provisions of the Act.
Generally, a state's adjusted payment level is the average of the money payments that
individuals with no other income received in January 1972, plus the bonus value of food
stamps. Id. This concept of an "adjusted payment level" is discussed more fully in connection
with the "cashing out" of food stamps under the SS1 program. See notes 97-98 and
accompanying text infra. For an excellent and concise analysis of the relationship between
"hold harmless" and a state's "adjusted payment level," see McInnis v. Weinberger, Civil No.
74-1481-T (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 1975).
13 Currently, 12 states and the District of Columbia have chosen federal administration
of both their mandatory and optional SSI supplementation programs (California, District of
Columbia, Hawaii, Iowa, Massachusetts, Michigan, Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsyl-
vania, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin) with California and New York accounting
for over 72% of all state supplementation administratively disbursed by the federal govern-
ment. These states are generally the ones that were paying the highest average monthly
payments under the former adult categorical assistance programs based on October 1973
data. See Callison, Early Experience Under the Supplemental Security Income Program, 37 Soc. SEC.
BULL., June 1974, at 3-9. Eighteen states have elected for federal administration of their
mandatory supplementation benefits (Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indi-
ana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Montana, Ohio, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Wyoming). Fourteen states administer their own mandatory
and optional supplementation (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Idaho,
Kentucky, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampsbire, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Oregon, and
Vermont), and five states administer only the mandatory SSI payments (Mississippi, New
Mexico, North Dakota, Virginia, and West Virginia). Texas does not provide supplementary
benefits because of a state constitutional barrier. Id. at 9.
14 See generally HOUSE REPORT 1-6; 118 CONG. REC. 32,905 (1972) (remarks by Senator
Randolph); 118 CONG. REc. 32,470-75 (1972) (remarks by Senator Long); 117 CONG. REC.
21,341 (1971) (remarks by Representative Byrnes); 58 CORNELL L. REv. 803 (1973). Because
the SSI program was coupled with the Nixon Administration's proposal for a sweeping
reform of AFDC, the legislative history of SSI is meager. Perhaps the situation was best
described by Representative Randall on the House floor when he remarked:
At the expense of being repetitive, a summary of H.R. 1 will reveal that it bas
five titles. Title I deals with the amendments to the social security program. Title II
relates to medicare, medicaid, and child health. Title III covers provisions relating to
assistance for the aged, blind, and disabled. Title IV is the family assistance
program that has been thoroughly discussed, and title V covers related assistance
provisions.
Put in proper perspective, I think it would be a fair and reasonable conclusion
to state that of the five titles, only one has been the subject of serious attack here on the floor
[title IV dealing with the family assistance program] and the other four titles are
not only acceptable but welcomed by a majority of the membership.
117 CONG. REc. 21,394 (1971) (emphasis added).
15 See note 3 supra.
'n The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act (subsequently enacted as Act of Oct.
30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, §§ 101 et seq., 86 Stat. 1329) originally contained the Nixon
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hope that even though the adult programs were more susceptible
to rapid and efficient reform than the family programs, 17 the
experience gained under SSI could be used to eliminate some of
the many obstacles that stand in the way of more comprehensive
welfare reform.
The purpose of this Note is to analyze the early judicial,
legislative, and regulatory developments that have taken place in
the SSI field during 1974 and to evaluate their possible implica-
tions for future welfare proposals. The year's judicial and legisla-
tive activity has generally centered around the inevitable problems
caused by the transition to a new program; Congress's aborted
attempt to abolish the Food Stamp program for SSI recipients; the
"grandfather" provisions of the act;1 8 and the monumental ad-
Administration's proposals for a Family Assistance Plan and an Opportunities for Families
Program that would have made far-reaching changes in the existing AFDC-welfare struc-
ture. This reform measure was killed in the House-Senate Conference Committee largely
because the House would not agree to provisions added by the Senate, nor would the Senate
agree to the original House proposals. See Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, 2
WELFARE L. NEws No. 3 (Nov. 1972). It is interesting to note, however, that the basic
administrative structure of the AFDC reform measures mirrored the structure of the SSI
program that was finally adopted. See generally HOUSE REPORT 25-35. Only in the controver-
sial area of work requirements and incentives did the two programs substantially differ,
which is quite understandable in light of the differing populations encompassed within the
two programs.
Assuming, therefore, that some type of future compromise can be designed to cope with
the problem of work incentives, one could reasonably expect to see a program similar in
administrative structure to SSI, or in the alternative, an enlargement of the population
eligible under modified SSI guidelines. President (then Representative) Ford's views on the
future course of welfare reform were succinctly expressed when, during the debate over
H.R. 1, he remarked:
Mr. Speaker, the only practical way we have to replace the present welfare
system is to cast our votes today for H.R. 1 with its welfare reform tide intact. There
are no realistic alternatives that can or will be enacted by this Congress, and the only other
course before us is to do nothing about the present welfare mess, which will be very
hard for any of us to justify.
The bill we are now considering calls for a drastic realinement of Federal-State
relationships; a realinement designed to end the untenable situation which sees 54
different welfare systems in operation, each with its own eligibility standards,
benefit levels, and administrative procedures.
H.R. 1 provides for a basic Federal payment together with a guarantee that
States which choose to supplement this payment will not have to exceed their
expenditures for calendar year 1971. The 54 systems thus would be replaced by
one, with national eligibility standards, a basic Federal payment, and Federal
administration-a tangible illustration of the new federalism which holds that each
level of government should discharge those finctions it does best.
I believe that reasonable people will agree that we have not lacked for
discussion on the issue of the kind of welfare system that will best meet the needs of the
1970's. Welfare reform-meaningful reform-is within our grasp.
117 CONG. REc. 21,345-47 (1971) (emphasis added).
17 See HOUSE REPORT 146.
" See note 11 and accompanying text supra.
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ministrative delays that occurred in the initial payment of benefit
checks during the first few months of 1974--despite a lead-in time
period of over a year. Regulatory activity was far more comprehen-
sive as the Social Security Administration of the Department of
Health, Education and Welfare (HEW) began issuing final regula-
tions governing the critical day-to-day operations of the program.
Many of the regulations are particularly important because they
have a tendency to restrict the availability and amount of benefits,
often in violation of the spirit or statutory language of the Social
Security Act.19 Selected regulations will be analyzed in terms of
available options that were open to the Administration and the
consequences of choosing one alternative over another.
1.
JUDICIAL ACTIVITY
A. Administration
Although the early trickle of cases reported in 1974 produced
no landmarks in the SSI area, many of the issues presented were
symptomatic of the inherent problems caused by a changeover to a
federally administered program. In no case was this more apparent
than in Fuller v. Nassau County Dep't of Social Services.20 In Fuller, a
class action seeking a declaratory judgment was brought in state
court to determine what state and local responsibility existed after
January 1, 1974, for the care of persons who had formerly been
receiving adult categorical assistance and were now entitled to
federal SSI benefits, but whose grants in the early months of 1974
were either terminated or reduced far below their prior entitle-
ment.21 The background of the situation was aptly described by
Judge Harnett:
The mess arose in January, 1974 with a new changeover in
the Aid to the Aged, Blind, and Disabled program (AABD).
Where previously the States made the assistance grants in the
first instance, now the Federal Government has assumed that
responsibility. In the course of what is undeniably a massive
administrative task, apparently large numbers of recipients failed
to receive any January or February checks, or in many other
instances, received sums significantly below their true entitle-
ment. Whether this results from machine or programming in-
adequacy, improper input data, lack of intergovernmental co-
operation, blown fuses, or files dropped between cabinets, the
'" See notes 137-66 and accompanying text infra.
20 77 Misc. 2d 677, 352 N.Y.S.2d 978 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
21 Id. at 677-80, 352 N.Y.S.2d gt 981-83.
1975]
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drastic facts remain that either no payment or underpayments
have resulted on a large scale. These people need, want, and ask
for their entitlement from someplace.
22
No one disputed the fact that the petitioners were entitled to
their benefits; the only controversy concerned "who pays and
when."23 Yet those seeking payment were left in a particularly
precarious position.2 4 Although the federal government did not
appear in the action, the court commented that its position was
"purely one of patience-someone else's patience to be sure-the
matter [to be] corrected in due time. 25 The state and county, on
the other hand, were worried about federal preemption and 'the
possibility of double payments with no corresponding reimburse-
ment.26 The court was neither moved nor persuaded by these
arguments and candidly admitted that although "the case [offered]
a veritable panoply of technical points through which the court
and counsel have picked their way .... [s]imple humanity and
common sense" 27 required but one result: the recognition of a
residual New York local duty of care for needy SSI recipients for
whom all other provisions had failed.28
Finding no language in either the federal or state SSI-related
legislation that required or suggested a total preemption of state
and local responsibility by the federal government, the-court
turned to applicable state law. There it found broad constitution-
a129 and statutory3 ° language imposing a "duty upon localities to
22 Id. at 678, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 981 (emphasis in original).
2 Id. at 677, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 981 (emphasis in original).
24 As the court explained:
Our poverty stricken aged, blind, and disabled, asking for their next welfare
check as their financial breath, hear in horro each of the giant bureaucracies of
the county, State, and Nation blithely reply, "who, me?" Unfortunately, this current
version of a great American game falls with barsh impact on a most vulnerable
segment of our society. In the language of legal precincts, it is Exhibit A in the
mindless absorption of human bings into computerized oblivion.
Id.
25 Id. at 678, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 981.
26 Retroactive federal reimbursement for interim state payments to SSI beneficiaries
was subsequently provided. Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-369, § 5, 88 Stat. 420. See
notes 131, 133 and accompanying text infra.
27 77 Misc. 2d at 679, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 983.
28 Id. at 683-84, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 986-87.
29 The aid, care and support of the needy are public concerns and shall be
provided by the state and by such of its subdivisions, and in such manner and by
such means, as the legislature may from time to time determine.
N.Y. CONsT. art. XVII, § 1.
30 [E~ach public welfare district shall be responsible for the assistance and care of
any person who resides or is found in its territory and who is in need of public
assistance and care which he is unable to provide for himself.
N.Y. Soc. SERv. LAW § 62(1) (McKinney 1966).
[Vol. 60:825
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meet [the] urgent and basic needs of their indigent residents,"'
and accordingly concluded that
[a]lthough provision was made in 1973 State legislation for the
SSI takeover of recurrent needs of aged, blind, and disabled
New Yorkers previously met by State disbursement, the basic
duty of care... remained in the State and local agencies.... The
Federal responsibility is "primary", but it is not exclusive.32
New York had specifically made provision for the former adult
categorical assistance recipients whose needs were not met by the
SSI program,3 3 and the court suggested that this residual channel
of aid, when all others had failed, 4 fulfilled the state's obligation
under its constitutional and statutory mandate. 5
Under Fuller, the state's concern that the emergency payments
would not elicit federal reimbursement could not "be used as a
basis for denying aid so urgently needed.13 6 In fact, the court
ordered the entire controversy between the competing bureau-
cracies over ultimate financial burden and appropriate formulas for
reimbursement to proceed in another forum.3 7 The alternatives
suggested by the court for protecting New York's financial in-
terests, if future payments became necessary, included: recovery of
duplicate payments, assignment of forthcoming federal assistance,
and more efficient interagency communication with the federal
government.3 8 Significantly, Fuller has now been followed by sev-
31 77 Misc. 2d at 684, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 987 (emphasis added).
32 Id.
11 See N.Y. Soc. SERV. LAW § 131-a(10) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
mhe department may promulgate regulations ...to provide for the needs of
aged, blind or disahled persons, whose needs are not met by federal supplemental
security income and/or additional state payments.
Id.
I 4 The state and local duty to provide emergency care may not be automati-
cally invoked if an isolated SSI check simply does not arrive at the first of the month.
It is only after a reasonable effort has been made at the Social Security Administra-
tion office to secure due payment, and the effort has proved unsuccessful, that the
residual responsibility arises. Here, a widespread administrative breakdown is
concededly in conspicuous being.
77 Misc. 2d at 686, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 989. See also notes 21-22 and accompanying text supra.
31 77 Misc. 2d at 684-85, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
36 Id. at 686-87, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
37 Id.
38 New York has a number of possible alternatives, other than blanket denial
of its duty of care, that will protect its legitimate fiscal concerns. If the State is
concerned about duplicate payment, it can protect itself under existing provision
allowing legal procedure against social service recipients where assets (in this case,
one of double payments) are located. Indeed, it may condition its payment on
assignment by the recipient of his claim to any duplicate benefit from the Federal
Government. Immediate interagency communications may be established so that a
due-but-late Federal check can be intercepted and stopped after a State grant has
been issued (with later negotiation between the government bodies as to which one
is to bear the ultimate burden for such monies expended).
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eral New York cases dealing with the local government's responsi-
bility to provide emergency public assistance to those whose needs
have not been met by SSI.39
Szanto v. Dumpson40 presented the New York courts with a
situation closely analogous to that in Fuller. Petitioner Ellen Szanto
sought a judgment ordering the commissioner of the city depart-
ment of social services to make public assistance payments available
to her and members of a class consisting of persons in need of
assistance during the pendency of their applications for supple-
mental security income.41 However, in contrast to Fuller, the de-
fendant in Szanto denied any responsibility by specifically referring
to "emergency" assistance available to the petitioner under the
federal SSI program42 and the state's Emergency Assistance for
Adults program.43 The court noted that these one-time grants to
alleviate hardship failed to meet the petitioner's continuing need
for interim assistance and, relying heavily upon the rationale of
Id. at 679, 352 N.Y.S.2d at 982 (footnotes omitted); see also notes 131-33 and accompanying
text infra.
39 See Elms v. LaVine, 79 Misc. 2d 1, 358 N.Y.S.2d 590 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Szanto v.
Dumpson, 77 Misc. 2d 392, 353 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1974); Gonzalez v. Parry, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. 19,331 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. May 31, 1974); Artrip v. Weinberg, 2 CCH Pov. L.
REP. 19,200 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. April 10, 1974). See also Dennis v. Norton, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP.
20,588 (D. Conn. Feb. 10, 1975); Dias v. Chang, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 20,545 (Cir. Ct.
Hawaii Jan. 31, 1975). But see Arnold v. Dumpson, 78 Misc. 2d 703, 356 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup.
Ct. 1974). In Arnold, the petitioner had received SS1 checks for the first three months in
1974 before the checks were abruptly terminated due to a computer mix-up. She was
instructed by the Social Security Administration to apply to the local Department of Social
Services for interim emergency benefits and sought the help of the court in obtaining such
assistance. The court directed the City Commissioner of social services to provide a portion
of the requested assistance pending final trial on the merits, but also required the petitioner
to apply to the federal courts for mandamus relief against the Social Security Administra-
tion. The court believed that the United States District Court would have jurisdiction in such
a matter under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1970), and that "[s]uch a procedure, if available, would
eliminate the whole complicated set of consequences of an order by this court and would
simply and directly order the agency primarily responsible to perform its clear duty." 78
Misc. 2d at 706, 356 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
40 77 Misc. 2d 392, 353 N.Y.S.2d 683 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
41 Id. at 393, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 684-85.
42 The Secretary . . . may make to any individual initially applying for benefits
under this subchapter who is presumptively eligible for such benefits and who is
faced with financial emergency a cash advance against such benefits in an amount
not exceeding $100[.]
42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(4) (Supp. 111, 1973).
in fact, the petitioner had filed for and received the maximum federal emergency
stipend of $100; however, because of the inordinate length of time needed to process her
application (four to six weeks), she was presently without funds and in fear of being evicted
from her home for nonpayment of rent. 77 Misc. 2d at 394, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 685.
43 18 NYCRR 397 (1974).
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Fuller, granted the relief requested. 4 While noting that Fuller and
subsequent decisions 45 were limited to persons who had previously
been receiving adult categorical assistance, the court saw no ra-
tional basis for distinguishing between the two situations."
A recent class action filed in the Eastern District of Pennsyl-
vania sought to attack the problem presented in Szanto more
directly. Realizing the inadequacy of federal emergency assistance
during the pendency of an application, and the amount of time
presently taken to process an initial determination claim, the plain-
tiffs in Huntzman v. Weinberger47 challenged, on fifth amendment
due process grounds, the administrative procedures under which
applications for SSI are processed. Because the applicable HEW
regulations provide no time limitations within which determina-
tions as to eligibility must be made,48 plaintiffs argued that the
program results in a denial of reasonably prompt adjudication of
their rights to such benefits.
49
The preceding cases illustrate two continuing problem areas in
the federal SSI administrative structure which must be recognized
in any future attempt to federalize the welfare system. First,
administrative delays are to be expected during the transitional
stages of any new program and it is therefore imperative that local
responsibility for interim emergency assistance be clearly defined
and encouraged with federal reimbursement specifically guaran-
teed.50 Second, if state responsibility is not desired, the federal
44 77 Misc. 2d at 396, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
45 See note 39 and accompanying text supra.
46 77 Misc. 2d at 396, 353 N.Y.S.2d at 687.
47 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 462 (1974) (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 16, 1974).
41 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1401-05, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,982-83 (1974).
49 The plaintiffs in Huntzman sought a declaratory judgment that the Secretary of HEW
was violating their constitutional rights by failing to provide: (1) prompt and timely
determinations concerning initial entitlement; (2) an opportunity to be heard for applicants
who were victims of unreasonable delays; and (3) an adequate remedy for those who sought
to appeal such delays. The requested relief included, inter alia: (1) an order directing the
Social Security Administration to make initial determinations within a period of 30 days; (2)
payment of benefits on the 31st day and continuing until such time as a decision had been
rendered; and (3) the same rights to administrative and judicial review guaranteed recipients
whose assistance had been reduced, suspended, or terminated, where applications were
unreasonably delayed heyond 30 days. 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 462 (1974) (E.D. Pa., filed
Sept. 16, 1974).
50 See Arnold v. Dumpson, 78 Misc. 2d 703,356 N.Y.S.2d 784 (Sup. Ct. 1974) and note 39
supra for the time-consuming alternative of federal mandamus relief. In the original House
version of the SSI bill, broad administrative powers were to be given to the states during the first
year of the program's operation to provide for an orderly transition. See HOUSE REPORT 158.
In order to achieve an orderly transition from the present State programs,
your committee's hill would provide that during the first year of the program,
1975]
CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 60:825
government should assure a reasonable amount of prompt assis-
tance to those persons who are "presumptively eligible"5' and faced
with a "financial emergency." 52
B. Due Process Requirements of Notice and Fair Hearings
The attempt to summarily purge from the welfare roles those
SSI recipients of questionable eligibility led to numerous class
actions in 1974 challenging the government's power to carve out
certain exceptions to the rule of Goldberg v. Kelly. 53 In Goldberg, the
Supreme Court held that a recipient must be afforded notice and
the opportunity for an evidentiary hearing prior to the termina-
tion, reduction, or suspension of public assistance benefits. Accord-
ing to arguments advanced by HEW, the purported exceptions
encompass reductions, terminations, or suspensions mandated, in-
ter alia, by: (1) clerical or mechanical errors made with respect to
eligibility determinations or amount of benefits; (2) amendments to
federal law requiring automatic suspension, reduction, or termina-
tion of assistance; or (3) an incorrect decision with respect to
eligibility or amount of payment at the time a recipient was
"converted" to the SSI program from the superseded public assis-
tance titles of the Social Security Act.54 The practice of terminating
benefits prior to notice and a fair hearing has been attacked as
interim agreements could be made between the States . . . and the Secretary of
Health, Education, and Welfare. These agreements would provide for a State to
administer, on behalf of the Secretary, the new Federal program for the aged,
blind, and disabled during a part or all of such year.
Id.
51 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.520(b)(2), 39 Fed. Reg. 29,089 (1973).
52 See 20 C.F.R. § 416.520(b)(3), 39 Fed. Reg. 29,089 (1973).
53 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See Mothers' and Children's Rights Organization v. Sterrett, 467
F.2d 797 (7th Cir. 1972); Almenares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 944 (1972); Elliott v. Weinberger, 371 F. Supp. 960 (D. Hawaii 1974); Lyons v.
Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
" See Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 258-63 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 416.1336(a)(1)-(4), 40 Fed. Reg. 1512 (1975); 39 Fed. Reg. 12,028 (1974).
(a) Advance written notice of intent to discontinue payment because of an event
requiring suspension, or to reduce..., or terminate payments prior to effectuation
of the action will be given in all cases except where:
(2) Amendments to Federal law or an increase in benefits payable under
Federal law (other than benefits payable under this part) require automatic suspen-
sion, reduction, or termination of benefits under this part; or
(3) Clerical or mechanical error has been made in effectuation of a determina-
tion or decision under this part . ...
20 C.F.R. §§ 416.1336(a)(2)-(3), 40 Fed. Reg. 1512 (1975) (emphasis added).
Determination of amount of payment in converting from the Federal-State public
assistance programs to SSI is considered to be part of the initial process of establish-
ing eligibility and amount of payment.
39 Fed. Reg. 12,028 (1974) (emphasis added).
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violative of botb procedural due process and the Social Security
Act. In 1974, SSI recipients succeeded in enjoining such practices
in a substantial number of cases. 55 Lyons v. Weinberger,5 n Ryan v.
Shea,57 and Cardinale v. Weinberger5s are representative of the
various factual and legal issues underlying the controversy.
In Lyons, disabled, blind, and elderly persons who were receiving
cash benefits in December 1973 pursuant to New York's Combined
Program for Aged, Blind and Disabled Persons (AABD), 59 and
who were transferred as of January 1, 1974 to the federally
administered SSI program, had their mandatory minimum state
supplemental benefits reduced by federal agency officials without
prior notice and hearing.60 In support of this action, and relying
on recently proposed regulations, HEW argued that the reductions
were merely determinations of the level of initial entitlement under
the SSI program to which the Goldberg rule was inapplicable.6 1
Although questioning HEW's interpretation of its own regula-
tions,6 2 the court, assuming arguendo a correct interpretation, held
that "the regulations, as applied, are unconstitutional and in viola-
tion of the Social Security Act .... -63
" See Padilla v. Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,933 (D.N.M. Sept. 24, 1974)
(class preliminary injunction entered Sept. 24, 1974); Brown v. Weinberger, 382 F. Supp.
1092 (D. Md. 1974) (class permanent injunction entered October 14, 1974); Atwater v.
Weinberger, Civil No. C-74-243-D (M.D.N.C., filed Aug. 9, 1974) (class preliminary injunc-
tion entered September 17, 1974); Reed v. Weinberger, Civil No. C-74-936 (N.D. Ohio, filed
Oct. 17, 1974) (class preliminary injunction entered October 24, 1974); Saurino v. Wein-
berger, Civil No. 74-140 (D.R.I., filed June 14, 1974) (class temporary restraining order
entered July 15, 1974 continuing in effect pending disposition on the merits by stipulation
of parties). Contra, Soule v. Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,618 (D. Mass. June 17,
1974) (interim relief denied for failure to exhaust administrative remedies); Hannington v.
Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 20,517 (D.D.C. Feb. 26, 1975).
56 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
57 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,468 (D. Colo. June 21, 1974) (class preliminary injunction
entered June 21, 1974).
5" Civil No. 74-930 (D.D.C., filed July 13, 1974).
59 N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW §§ 320-25 (McKinney 1966).
6' 376 F. Supp. at 251-52.
61 Id. at 258-60. See also notes 159-63 and accompanying text infra.
62 "While the Secretary's interpretation of his own regulations is entitled to great
weight, it is possible that, after trial on the merits, the court will conclude that the
regulations do require advance hearings ii cases such as Mr. Lyons'." 376 F. Supp. at 259
(footnote omitted).
63 Id. Perhaps the court's analysis can best be summarized by its statement that
[a] state would not be permitted to evade the requirements of Goldberg v. Kelly
simply by transferring its public assistance programs to a new agency and, then,
labeling terminations of welfare *payments determinations of initial entitlement.
There is, of course, no reason to suggest that Congress, in enacting the
Supplemental Security Income amendments, intended such a result. Instead, Con-
gress specifically geared the S.S.I. benefits to the assistance levels paid by the states
in December, 1973.
Id. at 260.
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The court's conclusion rested on four premises: (1) converted
SSI recipients have a statutory entitlement to the benefits they had
been receiving from the states in December 1973;64 (2) the pro-
cedural due process requirements outlined in Goldberg apply to
reductions as well as to terminations or suspensions of welfare
benefits; 65 (3) the proposed reductions rested on "incorrect or
misleading factual premises," or on the misapplication of rules and
policies to the facts of the particular case; 66 and (4) that in this
particular kind of case, "the individual's interest in a prior hearing
outweigh[s] the Government's interest in summary adjudication.167
These four premises have formed the basis for subsequent attacks
upon HEW's actions in this area of the law.
The issue of whether the federal government could terminate
SSI benefits prior to adequate notice and hearing was substantially
narrowed in the case of Ryan v. Shea. 68 In Ryan, HEW abandoned,
for all practical purposes, its reliance on applicable regulations, and
contended instead that before the alleged beneficiaries were con-
stitutionally entitled to notice and a prior hearing, they must be
deemed to possess a "property interest"--i.e., some form of statu-
tory entitlement-in the continued receipt of SSI benefits. 69 Plain-
tiffs represented a special class of "presumptively disabled" indi-
viduals who were required to meet a new federal test of disability
because of their late application for state benefits under the former
64 Recipients of S.S.I. payments ... have a statutory entitlement to the henefits
they had been receiving in December, 1973 from the states. These payments, of
course, might subsequently be determined to be too high by the Secretary under
applicable statutory standards, just as, under state public assistance legislation, state
and local welfare officials might determine that existing payments to particular
individuals are excessive. In short, the court cannot see how transfer of aid
programs to the federal government modified recipients' rights to their previously
existing levels of benefits.
Id.
65 Goldberg... did not reach the question whether due process requires similar
procedural safeguards in advance of reductions of benefits ...
There is little room for doubt, however, that procedural due process is
applicahle to reduction of welfare benefits.
Particularly in cases involving those most dependent on public assistance for
their survival, even a modest reduction in benefits may cause the recipient "grievous
loss." In many cases, even a reduction of a few dollars may have a devastating effect
Id. at 261 (emphasis in original).
66 Id. at 262.
67 Id.
68 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 19,468 (D. Colo. June 21, 1974).
" Id. See also Brief for Appellant at 17-23, Ryan v. Shea, Civil No. 74-1517 (10th Cir.,
filed Oct. 17, 1974) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
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categorical assistance programs.7 0 Once an unfavorable determina-
tion was made, their assistance immediately terminated.
The concept of a "property interest" in disability benefits was
approached by the parties in Ryan in two divergent ways. Pointing
to statutory language in the SSI Act,7 1 HEW argued that the
applicable provisions merely gave it discretionary power to tem-
porarily grant presumptive payments pending an initial determina-
tion of eligibility.72 It was contended that because payments were
merely discretionary, the Act could not be construed to create a
property interest. In rejecting this argument, the district court
in Ryan followed a trend of authority in other district courts.7 3
Instead, attention was focused on three indicia enunciated by the
70 Individuals who would have been ineligible because they had excess resources and
income or because they did not meet the federal definition of disability were "grandfather-
ed" into the SSI program if they had been receiving aid under a state plan in December 1973
and if they met the definition of disability under the applicable state plan in effect for
October 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A) (Supp. II, 1972), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(E)
(Supp. 11, 1973). 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (Supp. IIl, 1973) (originally enacted as Act of July 9,
1973, Pub. L. No. 93-66, § 212, 87 Stat. 152) added to this program a requirement that
anyone who received aid under a state plan in December 1973 should receive a payment
from the state supplementing the federal payment to the extent necessary to maintain that
person's income at the December 1973 level.
Because of the conduct of certain jurisdictions where persons of duhious disability status
were being switched from welfare rolls to state disability rolls in anticipation of the federal
takeover, Congress, on December 30, 1973, enacted § 9 of Public Law 92-233 (42 U.S.C. §
1382c(3)(e) (Supp. III, 1973), amending, 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(3)(A) (Supp. 11, 1972)). Section 9
modified the grandfather clause of Public Law 92-603 to provide that not only must the
recipient have received benefits in December 1973, but also for at least one month prior to
July 1973. Thus, the plaintiffs in Ryan who became qualified under a state plan subsequent
to'july 1, 1973 had to meet the federal standard of disability in order to be eligible under
the SSI program. This sudden alteration of a program, which was to take effect on the
following day, caused the Social Security Administration to be confronted with an insur-
mountable task. A new determination of disability simply could not be made for all of the
people affected. To meet this situation, payments of benefits were made on the basis of
"presumptive disability" for a period of three months, which was later extended to the end
of 1974. 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(4)(B) (Supp. III. 1973), as amended, Act of March 28, 1974, Pub.
L. No. 93-256, § 1, 88 Stat. 52. See also note 71 and accompanying text infra.
71 Act of March 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 1, 88 Stat. 52 provides in pertinent
part:
Any individual who would be considered disabled.., except that he did not
receive aid under the appropriate State plan for at least one month prior to July
1973 may be considered to be presumptively disabled.., and may be paid supplemental
security income benefits ... on the basis of such presumptive disability. .. for any
month in calendar year 1974 for which it has been determined that he is
otherwise eligible for such benefits.., except that no such benefits may be paid on
the basis of such presumptive disability for any month after the month in which the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare has made a determination as to
whether such individual is disabled . ...
Id. (emphasis added).
12 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 69, at 17-23.
73 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
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plaintiffs that served to establish the existence of a property right:
(1) plaintiffs were previously receiving state welfare benefits that
constituted a property interest guaranteed due process protec-
tion;7 4 (2) plaintiffs received notifications from the Social Security
Administration, upon which they justifiably relied, establishing
their eligibility for SSI benefits;7 5 and (3) Congress in December
1973, and March 1974, acknowledged the existence of plaintiffs'
property interest by placing their class in a privileged category of
persons presumed eligible for SSI benefits.7 6 Although the con-
troversy over presumptive disability benefits is far from settled,
and is likely to be moot after 1974, 7 the implications for future
changes in the welfare structure are significant7 8 and will be
discussed in the final part of this section.7 9
11 Brief for Appellee at 32-34, Ryan v. Shea, Civil No. 74-1517 (10th Cir., filed Oct. 17,
1974) (on file at the Cornell Law Review).
As mentioned in the factual summary... each member of Plaintiffs' class, by
definition, has established his entitlement to welfare benefits under SSI's predeces-
sor program .... This form of aid has been denominated a "property interest" and
has been given full due process protection requiring notice and a hearing prior to'
its termination. See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) and Wheeler v. Montgomery,
397 U.S. 280 (1970). The Federal government's assumption of responsibility for the
administration of this program after January 1, 1974 should not serve to negate this
interest.
This Court should look, as did the Lyons court, past such self-serving labels to
the substance of the action. The transfer of administration which took place in
January 1974 did not extinguish Plaintiffs' pre-existing property interest. Rather, it
merely phased this interest into a new form which cannot now be withdrawn
summarily.
Id.
I 5 Id. at 34-35.
76 Id. at 33-36.
Defendant Weinberger argues that Public Laws 93-233 and 93-256 evince a
Congressional intent to disallow plaintiffs [sic] property interests in the continued
receipt of SSI benefits. The analysis contained in Defendant's Brief does little more
than state this as a conclusion. It should be noted that the original intent of Public
Law 92-603 creating the presumptive disability provision was intended to grant the
Secretary discretion to grant a new applicant SS1 payments during the application
process where two elements were present: An obviously disabling physical defect
and economic hardship. In contrast, Public Laws 93-233 and 93-256 are aimed at
groups of recipients being transferred from predecessor disability programs; re-
cipients who had already established their entitlement under similar, if not identical,
tests of disability. This legislation conveyed to plaintiffs the status of presumed eligibil-
ity for SSI benefits and allowed those benefits to continue until the presumption had
been rebutted.
Id.
7 Statutory authority under Public Law 93-256 to grant presumptive disability benefits
to SSI "converts" terminated December 31, 1974. Act of March 28, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-256,
88 Stat. 52.
78 For instance, it was estimated by the Secretary of HEW that to abide by the district
courts order in Ryan, requiring a prior hearing to all presumptively disabled persons before
assistance could be terminated, would cost the government approximately $536 per hearing.
Brief for Appellant, supra note 69, at 15 n.15.
7' See notes 90-92 and accompanying text infra.
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To date, Cardinale v. Weinberger8" represents the most exten-
sive attack upon HEW's policies in the due process area. All three
exceptions to the Goldberg rule are forcefully assailed by the plain-
tiffs, with particular emphasis on the factual issues that necessarily
underlie any prior termination of assistance based on a change in
federal law or a clerical or mechanical error. 81
The Cardinale plaintiffs argue persuasively that "[d]efendant's
exceptions to the rule of prior notice and hearing are based on his
failure or refusal to see that the application of even the clearest
rule of law may be inexorably intertwined with factual issues. 82
Thus, the HEW regulation requiring automatic suspension of
assistance due to amendments in federal law83--an increase in
Social Security benefits, for example-may involve a dispute
whether, on the facts of a particular case, the change in federal law
applies to the individual beneficiary-a situation obviously within
the reach of Goldberg when discontinuance is proposed.84
Similarly, it is argued that the exception for "clerical or
mechanical error '8 5 is self-contradictory. Having necessarily admit-
ted the initial fallibility of the SSI administrative system, HEW's
position, in effect, is that the corrections of alleged errors are
infallible. Not only is there no cause to believe that the first alleged
error would inevitably be proved to be error, there is also no cause
to believe that the "cure" might not turn out to be a compounding
of errors.86 Finally, assuming that an individual has been overpaid
due to a clerical or mechanical error, the question of whether
future payments should be reduced to recoup the overpayment
bristles with factual issues.8 7 The SSI Act itself prohibits recoup-
ment if it would result in "penalizing such [an] individual,... who
was without fault in connection with the overpayment, if adjust-
ment or recovery on account of such overpayment .. .would
defeat the purposes of this subchapter, or be against equity and
good conscience ... ."88 The HEW regulations on the question of
80 Civil No. 74-930 (D.D.C., filed July 13, 1974).
8' Points and Authorities in Support of Temporary Restraining Order and Preliminary
Injunction at 4-13, Cardinale v. Weinberger, Civil No. 74-930 (D.D.C., filed July 13, 1974)
(on file at the Cornell Law Review).
82 Id. at 6.
83 20 C.F.R. § 416.1336(a)(2), 40 Fed. Reg. 1512 (1975).
84 See Almanares v. Wyman, 453 F.2d 1075, 1079 n.3 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 944 (1972).
85 20 C.F.R. § 416.1336(a)(3), 40 Fed. Reg. 1512 (1975).
86 Points and Authorities, supra note 81, at 7.
87 See note 89 infra.
18 42 U.S.C. § 1389(b) (Supp. III, 1973).
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fault therefore require resolution of a myriad of factual issues.8 9
Obviously, the nature of a required hearing will depend upon the
kind of factual issues presented. An individual's interest in a prior
hearing must also outweigh the government's interest in summary
adjudication. But judicial recognition of the extent to which factual
issues underlie many of the automatic terminations of assistance
required by the existing regulations should bring about a system of
determinations more in keeping with the due process guarantees
outlined in Goldberg.
As the preceding discussion illustrates, the decision to "grand-
father" into the SSI program those former recipients of state
categorical assistance inevitably led to much of the controversy
surrounding the requisites of procedural due process in the SSI
field. Administrative and political considerations were instrumental
in initially securing enactment of the grandfather clauses, and yet
the developing problems have ostensibly been of that very nature.
Courts that have dealt with the problem of the SSI "convert"
have thus far largely based their decisions upon constitutional
grounds. 90 Therefore, to avoid similar problems in the implemen-
tation of future reform in the welfare area, new measures will have
to be explored; mere abolition of such clauses will not adequately
resolve the inequities. A streamlined, inexpensive hearing process,
tailored to the factual issues likely to be presented, appears most
desirable.91 As for the implications of a favorable decision for the
plaintiffs in Cardinale, the possible effects would surely be felt not
only in impending welfare reform measures, but also in the exist-
ing programs of SSI and AFDC.92
89 20 C.F.R. § 416.552, 39 Fed. Reg. 2013 (1974), dealing with the question of
recoupment of overpayments, would seem to require resolution of the following factual
issues:
(1) The individual's understanding of the reporting requirements;
(2) An agreement to report events affecting payments;
(3) Knowledge of the occurrences of events that should have been reported;
(4) Efforts to comply with the reporting requirements;
(5) Opportunities to comply with the reporting requirements;
(6) Understanding of the obligation to return checks that were not due; and
(7) Ability to comply with the reporting requirements.
90 See Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Ryan v. Shea, 2 CCH
Pov. L. REP. 19,468 (D. Colo. June 21, 1974); Brown v. Weinberger, 382.F. Supp. 1092
(D. Md. 1974); Stienstra v. Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 9 20,005 (D. Minn. Nov. 11,
1974); McVey v. Weinberger, 2 CCH Pov. L. REP. 5 19,990 (N.D. Ga. June 28, 1974).
91 See Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 262 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
92 See 59 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 4, at 938-49, for a thorough discussion of the
problems associated with the current HEW regulations relating to terminations of assistance
prior to notice in the AFDC area. A favorable decision for the plaintiffs in Cardinale would not
only increase that controversy, but would also add to the growing request for pretermination
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C. Food Stamp Eligibility
Only one significant case has surfaced in 1974 challenging the
constitutionality of the basic food stamp provisions of the SSI
program-Irizarry v. Weinberger.93 Irizary presented the rather
straightforward question of whether New York's policy of provid-
ing food stamp benefits to one group of needy SSI recipients, while
denying them to others, violated the equal protection and due
process clauses of the Constitution. However, to comprehend the
precise issues and specific legislative provisions involved, a cursory
explanation of the legislative history is necessary.
The 1972 amendments to the Social Security Act, which estab-
lished the Supplemental Security Income program, originally
excluded all individuals who were eligible for SSI benefits from
participation in the food stamp program.94 This was in conformity
with the federal government's dual long-range policy goals of: (1)
providing a uniform, nationwide, no-strings-attached form of cash
assistance grant to all eligible individuals similarly situated; 95 and
(2) gradually phasing out its program of in-kind food assistance. 96
To compensate for the loss of benefits, the Act further provided
that certain states had the option of increasing their supplemental
payments by the "bonus value" of food stamps 97  at federal
hearings by disappointed welfare recipients. On the other hand, if experience following the
decision in Goldberg is any indication of what the likely state response would be to such a
requirement, it might take years before implementation of the decision becomes truly effective.
See G. COOPER & P. DODYK, INCOME MAINTENANCE 304-07 (2d ed. 1973). See also note 78supra.
93 381 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
94 Effective January 1, 1974, section 3(e) of the Food Stamp Act of 1964 [7
U.S.C. § 2012(e) (1970)] is amended by adding at the end there of the following new
sentence: "No person who is eligible (or upon application would be eligible) to receive
supplemental security income benefits under title XVI of such Act shall be considered
to be a member of a household or an elderly l5erson for purposes of this Act."
Act of Oct. 30, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-603, § 411(a), 86 Stat. 1491. The 1964 Food Stamp Act
was enacted by Congress as one of the keystones of the War on Poverty. It was designed to
provide an alternative to direct distribution of federal foodstuffs, to more efficiently provide
an adequate nutritional level for low income households, and to boost the agricultural
economy of the United States. 7 U.S.C. §§ 2011-25 (1970).
95 See 20 C.F.R. §§ 1 10(a)-(d), 39 Fed. Reg. 28,626 (1974); notes 1-8 and accompanying text
supra.
96 See HOUSE REPORT 362 for an example of the government's concurrent attempt in
H.R. 1 (described in note 16 supra) to prohibit from participation in the Food Stamp
Program all beneficiaries receiving federal public assistance.
9 [T]he term "bonus value of food stamps in a state for January 1972" (with
respect to an individual) means-
(A) the face value of the coupon allotment which would have been provided to
such an individual under the Food Stamp Act for January 1972, reduced by
(B) the charge which such an individual would have paid for such coupon
allotment ....
42 U.S.C. § 1382e nt. (Supp. III, 1973).
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expense 98-i.e., "cashing out" food stamps.99
Later in the year, before the program even became opera-
tional, the foregoing provisions were twice amended by Public Law
93-8611° and Public Law 93-233.101 Under Public Law 93-86, food
stamps would still be available for a person who received less in
federal and state payments under the new system than he would
have received under the prior state welfare plan in December
1973, plus the bonus value of food stamps (determined by the Food
Stamp Schedule effective July 1973). Likewise, food stamps would
not be available to a person who received more in federal and state
payments than he had under the old program. Eligibility for food
stamps, therefore, was to be determined on an individualized basis.
The effect of the measure was explained by a later House Report:
9' Under the SSI program as originally enacted, a state could optionally supplement the
basic federal grant to an eligible individual. 42 U.S.C. § 1382e ( Supp. II, 1972), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 1382e (Supp. III, 1973). Moreover, insofar as a state, such as New York, had
previously provided these optional supplements under its categorical assistance programs,
the Secretary of HEW would guarantee that the state would not have to spend more total
dollars annually in the form of new optional supplements than it had previously spent on
grants under the old Title XVI programs during the calendar year 1972. 42 U.S.C. § 1382e
nt. (Supp. III, 1973). This guaranteed level is known as the "hold harmless" level. The hold
harmless level was incorporated into the Act to protect states from the costs of financing
increased welfare caseloads. Thus, if the annual aggregate amount of optional payments
exceeds the states total outlay with respect to the aged, blind, and disabled for calendar year
1972, that excess will be paid by the federal government.
The "adjusted payment level," however, is the statutory proviso which prevents a state
from generously giving high optional benefits while the federal government picks up the
bill. Id. The adjusted payment level disallows credits toward hold harmless if the state makes
excessive optional payments. Specifically, 42 U.S.C. §' 1382e provides that a state cannot have
a credit toward "hold harmless" for any portion of the optional supplementation which
exceeds the adjusted payment level. For purposes of this discussion, the adjusted payment
level is comprised of the following two components: first, the theoretical money payments a
totally indigent individual would have received under a state's categorical aid program in
effect for January 1972; and second, the bonus value of food stamps. If a state adds the
bonus value to the adjusted payment level, it is said to have "cashed out" its food stamps.
That is, an individual receives cash in lieu of food stamps. Based on January 1972 levels, the
bonus value of food stamps is $10 per month for an individual and $20 for a couple. Dep't
of HEW, Social Security in Review, 38 Soc. SEC. BULL., Jan. 1975, at 1, 2.
Therefore, if a state has cashed out its food stamp program and is providing optional
supplementation equal to the maximum adjusted payment level, but above the hold
harmless level, some portion of these payments is being made at the federal government's
expense.
99 See note 98 supra.
100 Act of Aug. 10, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-86, § 3(b), 87 Stat. 221, amending 7 U.S.C. §
2012(e)(3) (1970).
101 7 U.S.C. § 2012 nt. (Supp. 111, 1973) (originally enacted as Act of Dec. 30, 1973,
Pub. L. No. 93-233, § 8, 87 Stat. 947). The amendments were passed because as the January,
1974 implementation date for SSI drew near, it became increasingly evident to many
members of Congress that thousands of SSI recipients under the new program would suffer
a substantial decrease in total benefits due to the loss of food stamp eligibility. See 119 CONG.
REc. 10,735 (1973) (remarks of Senator Kennedy).
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The principle [behind Public Law 93-86] was an entirely reason-
able one [to make sure no one suffered a loss in benefits due to
the transfer to a new program] but the complexities of adminis-
tration caused the States to conclude that it was unworkable. They
were faced with making determinations of how much income
applicants would have had under the rules of State welfare
programs which were no longer operative.
1 0 2
Recognizing the difficulties inherent in this situation, Congress
enacted Public Law 93-233.103 The individualized system of deter-
mining food stamp eligibility, provided for by Public Law 93-86,
was postponed until July 1, 1974,104 and for the six month interim
period'0 5 persons receiving new federal benefits were to be eligible
for food stamps unless they resided in a state which had elected to
"cash out"'0 6 the bonus value of the stamps. New York was one of
five such states with a cash out program' 0 7 which ultimately pro-
duced the following results: (1) all SSI recipients were rendered
ineligible for food stamps; (2) an amount equal to the average
bonus value of food stamps was paid only to new recipients of
SSI' 0 S--those who first applied for benefits after January 1,
1974-to compensate them for the loss of food stamps; and (3)
since those persons who had been grandfathered into the new
program' 09 were only assured the same level of cash assistance as
they had received under the former categorical programs, 1 0 the
cash out merely reduced their level of entitlement-i.e., they were
rendered food stamp ineligible, but did not receive the benefit of
the cash out given to newly applying recipients. This last group of
SSI beneficiaries brought suit in Irizarry challenging the constitu-
tionality of Public Law 93-233.
The essence of plaintiffs' equal protection claim was that the
amendment allegedly created two classes of persons for "food
102 H.R. REP. No. 1081, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1974).
103 See note 101 supra.
104 Act of July 8, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-335, 88 Stat. 291 further postponed the
operation of Public Law 93-86 until July 1, 1975, and correspondingly extended the interim
provisions of Public Law 93-233. See notes 126-30 and accompanying text infra.
105 Id.
106 See note 98 supra.
107 The five "cash out" states are California, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York, and
Wisconsin. The Secretary of HEW has determined that pursuant to Public Law 93-233, these
states provide state supplementary payments that have been specifically increased to include
the bonus value of food stamps. In California Legislative Council for Older Americans v.
Weinberger, 375 F. Supp. 216 (E.D. Cal. 1974) plaintiffs unsuccessfully attacked the manner
in which the Secretary made this finding as to California, as well as the finding itself. Cf.
Mclnnis v. Weinberger, Civil No. 74-1481-T (D. Mass. Jan. 10, 1975).
108 Hereinafter referred to as optional SSI beneficiaries.
10' Hereinafter referred to as mandatory SSI beneficiaries.
,10 42 U.S.C. § 1382 nt. (Supp. III, 1973).
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assistance" purposes. The first class included needy New York
recipients of SSI who were, but for the challenged amendment,
financially eligible for food stamp benefits. The second class in-
cluded all other needy New York residents who were eligible for
benefits either in the form of food stamps or in the form of a food
stamp cash out. The denial of benefits to a needy class of individu-
als was challenged as arbitary, capricious, and not reasonably
related to the purposes of the Food Stamp Act.111
The court dismissed these allegations by following the princi-
ple established in Dandridge v. Williams:112 "If the classification has
some 'reasonable basis,' it does not offend the Constitution simply
because [it] 'is not made with mathematical nicety or because in
practice it results in some inequality.' "113 Mandatory SSI bene-
ficiaries indisputably received neither food stamps nor a food
stamp cash out, but the court was quick to point out that they did
receive "as a result of congressional mandate, considerably greater
SSI assistance than the optionally supplemented class . . ., food
stamp 'cash out' included.""' 4 This was so because the former level
of cash assistance provided by the state to mandatory SSI recip-
ients, and grandfathered into the SSI Act, was greater than the
level of assistance New York optionally sought to furnish new
applicants. Once this basic fact was established, it was easy for the
court to conclude that "[iut would be entirely rational for Congress
then to decide that it furthers its purpose of income maintenance
for the elderly, blind, and disabled to permit the states to grant an
additional SSI benefit to the less well situated optionally
supplemented class in the form of a food stamp 'cash out' without
giving any additional benefit to plaintiffs' mandatorily
supplemented class." 115
The plaintiffs' novel due process claims were also summarily
dismissed." 6 Congress had intended the very result occasioned by
111 Generally the Act's purpose is to alleviate hunger and malnutrition among low
income households by permitting such households the opportunity "to purchase a nutrition-
ally adequate diet through normal channels of trade." 7 U.S.C. § 2011 (1970).
112 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
113 Id. at 485, quoting Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
:14 381 F. Supp. at 1154.
15 Id. at 1154-55.
116 It was contended that in enacting the challenged amendments Congress erroneously
assumed that all SSI recipients would receive food stamps or a food stamp "cash out."
Plaintiffs then proceeded to characterize this alleged error as one that created, by statute, a
conclusive, irrebuttable presumption against which the plaintiffs could present no evidence.
This, it was claimed, resulted in harm to them in violation of their due process rights. Id. at
1155.
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the implementation of the Act in New York and, although the
method chosen was characterized as a "legislative sleight of hand,"
the court nevertheless concluded "it [was] not constitutionally vul-
nerable in this instance."" 17
The legislative background leading to the case of Irizarry
illustrates the tremendous administrative problems associated with
the implementation of a new welfare program. Equity and good
conscience dictate that those who are "converted" suffer no reduc-
tion in previously existing benefit levels; administrative considera-
tions, on the other hand, argue for a system that does not become a
bureaucratic morass. These goals are not mutually exclusive and
both might have been implemented when the SSI program was
first initiated by providing a level of federal assistance adequate to
meet the needs and rights of those persons grandfathered into the
program. As time passes, and the grandfathered group of recip-
ients dwindle, a uniform standard of eligibility will eventually be
achieved. In the interim, however, continuing controversy is likely
to be generated by the dual system of providing aid to the aged,
blind, and disabled.
II
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY
With one possible exception, 118 the SSI legislation passed by
Congress in 1974 was of an administrative nature and basically
remedial in character. Unavoidable delays, unrealistic time con-
straints, and the general problems associated with the implementa-
tion of a new governmental program explain most of the legislative
activity that did take place. Because many of the substantive
enactments have already been discussed in previous sections of this
Note, 119 the purpose of this section will be to explain the rationale
behind their passage, to evaluate their effectiveness, and to suggest
possible forms of incorporation, or change, with respect to future
welfare reform measures.
The time-consuming administrative process of determining
the initial eligibility under the SSI program of approximately 1.3
million disabled recipients of categorical assistance12 ° precipitated
117 Id.
118 See notes 132, 134-36 and accompanying text infra.
119 See notes 7, 26, 71, 104 and accompanying text supra.
12o See H.R. REP. No. 871, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare has indicated that enact-
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the first of a series of remedial legislative enactments which were
ultimately passed in 1974. All persons formerly receiving disability
benefits under the superseded titles of the Social Security Act had
to be identified and those individuals most recently placed on the
welfare rolls were required to satisfy a new federal test of disability. 121
The time table for completing this prodigious task was originally
three months.122 But as the deadline approached, the eligibility of ap-
proximately one-half to two-thirds of SSI converts, for whom
redeterminations had to be made, remained in doubt. 23 Rather
than suspend presumptive disability benefits to these individuals,
the Secretary of HEW asked for and received standby authority to
continue such payments until the end of the year. 24 The Act also
provided that those who did not meet the federal standard of
disability would not be considered to have been overpaid during
the time it took to review their cases.'25 As the preceding situation
illustrates, some type of initial standby authority to dispense pre-
sumptive eligibility payments for an adequate period of time-as
determined by the Secretary-to those converted to any new
welfare program is essential.
Later in the year, the complexities involved in administering
certain provisions of the SSI program 26 precipitated further con-
gressional postponement of the "individualized eligibility tests" for
ment of the provision in P.L. 93-233 [see notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra]
has created a workload that cannot be completed until the end of 1974. The first
step in implementing the provision is the screening of the 1.3 million disability cases
converted from State records to determine which individuals came on State disabil-
ity rolls after June 1973. This process-now partly completed-ultimately requires
manual searches of some of the State and County files.
Id.
121 See notes 70-71 and accompanying text supra. Disability is now defined under the
federal law as follows:
An individual shall be considered to be disabled for purposes of this subchap-
ter if he is unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any
medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to
result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous
period of not less than twelve months ....
42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A) (Supp. ll, 1973).
122 42 U.S.C. § 1383(a)(4)(B) (Supp. Ill, 1973), as amended, Act of March 28, 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93-256, § 1, 88 Stat. 52. See note 70 supra.
123 The Secretary of HEW had originally estimated that redeterminations of eligibility
would be required for 300,000 individuals who were converted to the SSI rolls. By the end
of March 1974, nearly 150,000 to 200,000 people were still awaiting such a determination.
H.R. REP. No. 871, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
124 See note 71 supra.
125 42 U.S.C. 9 1383(a)(4)(B) (Supp. III, 1973).
126 An explanation of the legislative background and problems associated with the
administration of Public Law 93-86, which required individualized determinations for food
stamp eligibility, is discussed in notes 93-106 and accompanying text supra.
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food stamps.1 27 The legislative history of the measure indicates that
Congress itself was not happy with the specific provisions of the
bill,128 but passed it to avoid the undesirable results associated with
inaction,1 29 and to give itself more time to work out a satisfactory
permanent solution to the problem. What that solution will be is
not yet evident, but if state administrators have anything to say
about the matter, the chances of a return to the provisions of
Public Law 93-86 seem highly remote.1 30
The final piece of SSI legislation passed in 1974 was perhaps
the most significant. It guaranteed federal reimbursement to the
states for interim assistance provided during the initial stages of
the program,1 3' and established an automatic cost-of-living adjust-
127 Public Law 93-335 (see note 104 supra) extended from six to eighteen months
(ending June 30, 1975): (1) the provisions of Public Law 93-233, which suspended operation
of the relevant provisions of Public Law 93-86; and (2) the provisions of Public Law 93-233,
which made all SSI beneficiaries eligible to purchase food stamps in states where there had
not been a specific "cash out," and made beneficiaries in those states which provided a "cash
out" ineligible to purchase food stamps.
128 The House Ways and Means Committee Report accompanying Public Law 93-335
stated:
[The] committee is not happy with the provisions of this bill as a permanent
solution and it, accordingly, is providing a period of 1 year in which to work out
more satisfactory provisions. However, in view of the pressures of time, the
undesirability of withdrawing either cash or food stamps from a significant number
of individuals in view of the recent price level increases and because the Social
Security Administration has not yet gotten the SSI claims load under a satisfactory
degree of control, an extension of time rather than an attempt to solve the problem
permanently was considered desirable.
H.R. REP. No. 1081, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1974).
129 The Committee Report summarized the results of inaction as follows:
(1) In the 45 States which have made no "cash out" a substantial proportion-
probably a majority--of SSI beneficiaries would lose their food stamps with no
prospect of compensating amounts of cash. In view of the rate of increase in food
prices in recent months this would be a highly undesirable result.
(2) All States including those which had made a "cash out" would be faced with
the individual determination described above. The States still believe that the
provisions of Public Law 93-86 [which] would become effective July 1 are virtually
unworkable. Moreover, the estimates of administrative costs in setting up a dual
determination system runs many millions of dollars. The Governor of one large
State has estimated the additional administrative costs at $35 million for his State
alone.
(3) In the five "cash out" States-California, Massachusetts, Nevada, New York
and Wisconsin-the same determination would have to be made and some SSI
beneficiaries would receive the "cash out" of about $10 and have their eligibility to
purchase food stamps restored. For such beneficiaries the Federal Government
would be paying twice for the bonus value of food stamps.
130 See notes 102, 128 and accompanying text supra.
131 Act of Aug. 7, 1974, Pub. L No. 93-368, 88 Stat. 420. Statutory authority guarantee-
ing federal reimbursement for state interim assistance expires June 30, 1976. To receive
these payments, however, a state must enter into certain agreements with the Secretary of
HEW, and the individual benefitted by state payments must sign a written authorization
assigning any subsequent federal payment to the state. Id.
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ment in applicable benefit levels.13 2 The first provision was largely
in response to disputes arising out of the late or nonexistent receipt
of benefit checks, as previously discussed.' 33 It protects both the
state and federal governments from the possibility of duplicate
payments to an otherwise eligible individual and ensures that states
will not suffer financially because of an administrative error on the
part of the federal government. A similar provision is likely to be
incorporated in any new welfare scheme.
The primary rationale behind the automatic adjustment in
benefit levels is to compensate for an increasing cost-of-living
among those beneficiaries on a fixed or stable income. It represents
a more logical approach to the problem than prior tactics used to
raise AFDC benefit levels,' 3 4 but its effectiveness could be seriously
threatened due to a large loophole in the law. While federal
assistance is hereinafter tied to rises in the cost-of-living, state
supplementation, both mandatory and optional, is not. In fact,
there is nothing in the federal law to stop a state from correspond-
ingly decreasing its assistance payments whenever the federal gov-
ernment is required to increase the benefits it provides. 35 As of
132 Id. The cost-of-living increases in SSI benefit levels are directly tied to similar
percentage increases in Social Security payments. 42 U.S.C. § 415(i) (Supp. III, 1973).
133 See notes 20-52 and accompanying text supra.
134 See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23) (Supp. III, 1973):
(a) A State plan for aid and services to needy families with children must
(23) provide that by July I, 1969, the amounts used by the State to determine
the needs of individuals will have been adjusted to reflect fully changes in living
costs since such amounts were established, and any maximums that the State
imposes on the amount of aid paid to families will have been proportionately
adjusted ....
Id. States tried to circumvent the requirements of § 602(a)(23) by a variety of methods. See,
e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397 (1970);
Roselli v. Affleck, 373 F. Supp. 36 (D.R.I. 1974); Utah Welfare Rights Org. v. Lindsay, 315
F. Supp. 294 (D. Utah 1970).
'35 The "loophole" in the cost-of-living provision is indicative of a problem that
pervades the entire SSI scheme-the lack of control by the federal government over the
level of optional state supplementation. However, the operation of the cost-of-living provi-
sion will have its desired effect in at least two possible situations: first, in the obvious case of
those 16 states which do not provide optional state SSI payments (Arkansas, Florida,
Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, New Mexico, Ohio, South
Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming); and second, in those
states such as California and Massachusetts which provide yearly cost-of-living increases in
their own state supplementation levels. See generally CAL. WELF. & lNST'NS CODE § 12201
(West Supp. 1975); MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 118A, § 2 ,Cum. Supp. 1974); Rigby, State
Supplementation Under Federal SSI Program, 37 Soc. SEc. BULL., Nov. 1974, at 21, 25. On the
other hand, in a state such as New York, where optional supplementation merely provides
for the difference between the basic federal grant and a total fixed payment, as the federal
grant rises through operation of the automatic cost-of-living provisions, the state supplement
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this early date, no reliable data is available to determine what the
states' response to this peculiar situation is or will be. One can
posit, however, that if remedial legislation is not forthcoming, the
federal government will be bearing an increasing share of all SSI
payments.
3 6
III
REGULATORY ACTIVITY
In terms of sheer volume, regulatory activity on the part of the
federal government, implementing the statutory provisions of the
SSI program, far surpassed any other development that occurred
in 1974. Newly adopted interim and final regulations appeared
almost weekly in the Federal Register, and even as of this late
date-nearly three years after SSI legislation was first enacted-
no end appears in sight. Consequently, a comprehensive discussion
of all or a significant part of the activity that did take place is
beyond the scope of this Note. Instead, the purpose of this section
will be to identify and briefly analyze three particular regulatory
areas which have been, or are likely to be, entangled in litigation
concerning their constitutional validity and/or statutory basis.' 37
The principle of eligibility based on need was specifically
embedded as one of the cornerstones of the SSI program in the
introductory language of the Act:
Every aged, blind, or disabled individual who is determined
... to be eligible on the basis of his income and resources shall, in
accordance with and subject to the provisions of this subchapter,
be paid benefits by the Secretary of Health, Education, and
Welfare. 138
Congress tempered this principle, however, with certain non-need
will correspondingly fall. An eligible individual, in such a state, will not benefit from the new
federal enactment. See N.Y. Soc. WELFARE LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
136 Recent gross data on the operation of the SSI program seems to support this
general proposition. See Dep't of HEW, Social Security in Review, 38 Soc. SEc. BuLL., Feb.
1975, at 1, 54:
State-administered supplementary payments, whicb amount to $9.8 million in
August [1974], continued their downward trend. This total represented a decline of
$371,000 from July [1974] and $5.1 million from January [1974] ....
The decrease in State payments since Jinuary is due primarily to the increase
in Federal SSI payments in February and July; the Federal payment was increased
to a point above the former State payment or above the current State payment
standard. State supplementation, therefore, was no longer required for many of the
recipients in the States.
137 It should be noted at the outset that while some of the regulations to be discussed
are clearly required by the applicable provisions of the SSI Act and, therefore, only vulner-
able to constitutional attack, others have a questionable statutory basis and are thus subject
to statutory as well as constitutional assault.
138 42 U.S.C. § 1381a (Supp. 1II, 1973) (emphasis added).
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eligibility criteria that included, inter alia, optional state residency
requirements139 and a system of attribution of income.1 40
HEW regulations in effect during 1974 provided that a state
could impose, as a condition of eligibility, a residency requirement
which would exclude from optional state supplemental payments
"any individual who has resided in such State . . . for less than a
minimum period of time prescribed by the State."141 This provi-
sion merely echoed the applicable statutory language found in the
Social Security Act.1 42 The nature and extent of its implementation
by the states is not yet known, and until specific statutes begin to
surface, it seems pointless to argue that the federal provision is
unconstitutional in the abstract.1 43 Unlike the statute involved in
the case of Shapiro v. Thompson, 144 the current SSI regulation does
not even mention a maximum period of time beyond which a
durational residency requirement is proscribed and, in fact, it
might be argued that the word "minimum" in the regulation means
just what it implies-a short period of time.' 45 Nevertheless, the
consensus of reported opinion to date advances the belief that state
139 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382e(c)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
140 See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(l) (Supp. III, 1973).
141 Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.2003(f), 38 Fed. Reg. 21,189 (1973).
142 Any State (or political subdivision) making supplementary payments ...
may at its option impose as a condition of eligibility for such payments . . . a
residence requirement which excludes individuals who have resided in the State (or
political subdivision) for less than a minimum period prior to application for such
payments.
42 U.S.C. § 1382e(c)(1) (Supp. III, 1973).
143 The language employed by the Supreme Court in the case of Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969), when it analyzed the constitutionality of a similar federal statute, is
particularly appropriate:
On its face, the statute does not approve, much less prescribe, a one-year
[residency] requirement.
But even if we were to assume, arguendo, that Congress did approve the
imposition of a one-year waiting period, it is the responsive state legislation which
infringes constitutional rights. By itself § 402(b) has absolutely no restrictive effect.
It is therefore not that statute but only the state requirements which pose the
constitutional question.
394 U.S. at 639-41 (emphasis in original). The same remarks could be made about the SSI
statute.
144 394 U.S. 618 (1969). See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(23)(b) (1970), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §
602(a)(23) (Supp. III, 1973), which requires that
[t]he Secretary . . . shall not approve any plan which imposes as a condition of
eligibility for aid to families with dependent children, a residence requirement
which denies aid with respect to any child residing in the State (I) who has re-
sided in the State for one year immediatclypreceding the application for such aid....
145 Carrying this argument one step further, it is possible to view 42 U.S.C. §
1382e(c)(1) (Supp. III, 1973) as an effective enforcement mechanism that could be used by
the federal government to strike down state residency requirements wlich were above a
minimum time period-one month for example.
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[d]urational residency requirements for state supplementary
grants under SSI would operate to penalize indigents who have
exercised their right to travel. Thus a standard of strict constitu-
tional scrutiny would appear applicable. Supportive of this con-
clusion is the fact that the gravity of this individual interest in
supplementation is substantial. There is little likelihood that such
a waiting period requirement would be grounded on a legitimate
state interest of sufficient importance to render impingement in
these circumstances of the right to travel constitutionally permissi-
ble.146
Another non-need criterion embodied in the SSI program-
utilized to determine the level of an applicant's income and re-
sources for eligibility purposes-established the principle that an
individual's "income and resources shall be deemed to include any
income and resources of [a] spouse, whether or not available to
such individual, except to the extent determined by the Secretary
to be inequitable under the circumstances.' 47 Standing alone, the
presumption created in the first clause of the provision appeared
vulnerable to constitutional attack.148 It was therefore hoped that
standards carrying out the intent of the second clause could be
formulated to eliminate this infirmity. The proposed regulations
issued by the Secretary of HEW in January 1974 not only dashed
this hope, but also created two further presumptions designed to
restrict the availability and amount of SSI benefits: (1) a maximum
allowable deduction placed on the spouse's expenses attributable to
earning the "deemed income"; and (2) the treatment of earned
income of the spouse as unearned income of the recipient. 49 An
'4 Note, Constitutional Law: Durational Residency Requirements for Supplemental Security
Income For the Indigent Aged, Blind, and Disabled, 25 SYRACUSE L. REv. 674, 688-89 (1974). See
generally Hearings on the Social Security Amendments of 1971 Before the Senate Comm. on Finance,
92d Cong., 1st Sess. 112 (1971) (testimony of E. Richardson, Secretary, HEW); 59 CORNELL L.
REv., supra note 4, at 891 n.191.
147 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(1) (Supp. III, 1973). This income attribution principle applies
only if the spouse (further defined in §§ 1382c(d)(1)-(2) as a legal spouse under state law, or
one who holds himself out to the community in which he resides as the spouse of the
applicant) lives in the same household as the applicant. Id.
148 See 59 CoRNELL L. REv., supra note 4, at 886-87 n.172.
19 In the case of an individual who is living in the same household with a
person not eligible for benefits under this part who is or who is considered to be
such individual's husband or wife ... such individual's income shall be deemed to
include any income. . . of such spouse whether or not such income is available to
such individual. However, in the case of earned income .. .of [the] spouse, such
earned income will be reduced by $65 a month . .. for all expenses attributable to the earning
of such income. . . . Income deemed to the eligible individual will be treated as
unearned income.
Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.1185(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 2487 (1974) (emphasis added). The
section, treating earned income of the ineligible spouse as unearned income of the applicant,
is particularly restrictive due to the income exclusion provisions of the SSI Act. 42 U.S.C. §§
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argument can be made that both of these propositions are of
questionable validity in light of recent Supreme Court decisions in
the welfare area 150 and the statutory language of the SSI Act
itself.' 5'
1382a(b)(2), (4) (Supp. III, 1973). Only a maximum of $20 per month of unearned income is
disregarded in determining the countable income of an SSI recipient. On the other hand,
$65 per month of earned income is disregarded, plus one-half of any earnings above this
figure. Id. It is therefore to the recipient's advantage to secure classification of the greatest
part of his income as "earned." The regulation in question sets up an irrebuttable presump-
tion against such a procedure.
150 In Shea v. Vialpando, 416 U.S. 251 (1974), the Supreme Court held, on statutory
grounds, that a state could not adopt a standardized allowance for expenses attributable to
the earning of income, which precluded AFDC recipients from deducting amounts in excess
of that standard. The decision was based upon a violation of the maximum work expense
deduction in the statutory provisions of the Social Security Act that required states to "take
into consideration ... any expenses reasonably attributable to the earning of... income." 42
U.S.C. § 602(a)(7) (Supp. III, 1973). Accord, Conover v. Hall, 11 Cal. 3d 842, 523 P.2d 682,
114 Cal. Rptr. 642 (1974) ($50 standard deduction for work expenses invalid). For a
discussion of these cases, see Note, 1974 Developments In Welfare Law-Aid To Families With
Dependent Children, 60 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 863-65 (1975).
The SSI Act provides that only the work expenses of the blind will be excluded in
determining a person's countable income for eligibility purposes. 42 U.S.C. § 1382
a(b)(4)(A)(ii) (Supp. III, 1973). Regardless of the constitutionality of this provision (possible
violation of the 14th amendment equal protection rights of aged and disabled individuals),
the 1973 regulations stipulate that in determining the unearned income of an individual,
"[t]he gross amount is reduced by any ordinary and necessary expenses incurred in getting
or receiving [it]." Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.1120, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,407 (1973). By placing a
maximum allowable deduction of $65 on the spouse's work-related expenses, the 1974
regulation therefore seems to conflict with the reasoning underlying the court's opinion in
Vialpando.
A constitutional argument might also be advanced that the 1974 regulation creates an
"irrebuttable presumption" that work expenses will never exceed $65, thereby resulting in a
denial of due process to those individuals whose expenses exceed that amount. See generally
United States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); United States Dep't of
Agriculture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973).
"I' That portion of the regulation dealing with the attribution of income might be
attacked in three ways.
First, earned income of the spouse that is not actually and currently available to the
recipient is not "income" within the statutory sense of the word. "Income" is defined for
purposes of Title XVI (SSI) as "the receipt by an individual of any property or service
which he can apply, either directly or by sale or conversion, to meet his basic needs for food,
clothing, and shelter." Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.1102, 38 Fed. Reg. 27,407 (1973).
Obviously, there is no "receipt" (actual or constructive) in the situation described above if the
spouse's earnings are not actually and currently available. Not even under the most
expansive definition of iucome found in the tax statutes would such earnings be deemed a
recipient's income. See generally James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961); Commissioner
v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955); Helvering v. Bruun, 309 U.S. 461 (1940);
Edwards v. Cuba Railroad, 268 U.S. 628 (1925); Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920).
Finally, one might simply point out that the statute creates an irrebuttable presumption that a
spouse's income is "received," in violation of a beneficiary's due process rights. See United
States Dep't of Agriculture v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508 (1973); United States Dep't of Agricul-
ture v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973); 59 CORNELL L. REV., supra note 4, at 886-87 n.172.
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The general problems associated with prolonged delays in
making determinations of initial entitlement have been mentioned
in previous sections of this Note. 152 Congress also recognized that
financial emergencies might arise during the pendency of an
application by providing for cash advances up to $100 for all those
presumptively eligible for SSI benefits and for presumptive disabil-
ity payments to certain individuals for a period of three months.1
53
These relief measures were premised on the belief that initial
determinations would be made within a period of thirty days and
no longer than ninety days would be needed to make a final
decision concerning an applicant's disability.' 54 When early experi-
ence under the program belied the accuracy of these assumptions,
it was hoped that HEW would at least promulgate regulations
setting a time constraint under which initial determinations would
have to be made, thereby effectively encompassing the congres-
sional premises into the operation of the statute. In September
Second, assuming, arguendo, that earned income of the spouse is "income" to the
recipient, it is not unearned income. Here, one might argue that because earned income of
an eligible spouse is treated as earned income of a recipient, there is no rational basis for
treating an ineligible spouse's income differently on equal protection grounds. As the
regulations now stand, an ineligible spouse with earned income of $2,000 will deprive an
applicant of all benefits under the SSI Act (only $240 will be disregarded), whereas if the
deemed income were to be categorized as earned income of the recipient, that person would
still receive more than $1,000 a year in SSI benefits (at least $1,500 would be disregarded).
See note 149 supra.
Finally, even assuming that earned income of the spouse is unearned income of the
recipient, the regulation is invalid, in part, because it provides no exceptions to the deemed
income rule when it would be inequitable under the circumstances, i.e., when it can be shown
that the spouse's income is not actually or currently available. See 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(f)(I)
(Supp. III, 1973).
152 See notes 40-52 and accompanying text supra.
,3 42 U.S.C. §§ 1383(a)(4)(A), (B) (Supp. III, 1973).
The Secretary-
(A) may make to any individual initially applying for benefits under this subchapter
who is presumptively eligible for such benefits and who is faced with financial
emergency a cash advance against such benefits in an amount not exceeding $100;
and
(B) may pay benefits.., to an individual applying for such benefits on the basis of
disability for a period not exceeding 3 months prior to the determination of such
individual's disability, if such individual is presumptively disabled and is determined
to be otherwise eligible for such benefits ....
Id.
154 The introductory remarks to 20 C.F.R. § 416, Subpart N, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,982
(1974) state:
By providing for the payment of as many as 3 months' benefits prior to the initial
determination where disability may be presumed, Congress has allowed at least 90
days for the making of an initial determination in a supplemental security income
claim based on disability. In other supplemental security income claims, Congress set
the amount of emergency cash advance at $100 because it was expected that in those
cases the initial determination can be made within 30 days.
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1974, Secretary of HEW Weinberger rejected the invitation, prefer-
ring instead to adopt a "wait and be patient attitude." This type of
approach was exemplified in his statement that
[a]lthough, at the present time, title XVI nondisability initial
determinations are taking longer to process than intended by
Congress, efforts are currently being directed toward making
these determinations in the shortest possible time and, as a
result, the Social Security Administration expects that, in the not
too distant future ... nondisability initial determinations can be
made in 30 days .... 155
A further justification for the rejection was that some SSI cases
were taking longer than thirty days to process and a thirty-day
maximum would therefore be "unrealistic."'156 This type of reason-
ing is not only circuitous, but if it represents the true state of
affairs in the Social Security Administration, the SSI Act should
immediately be amended to give the Secretary discretionary power
to provide cash advances above the statutory maximum of $100 to
those persons adversely affected by substantial delays. If this type
of legislative action is not taken, a judicial solution, somewhat
analogous to that requested in Huntzman,157 may be forthcom-
ing. 158
Much of the controversy surrounding the suits brought by
converted SSI recipients, who had their benefits reduced or termi-
nated prior to adequate notice and a fair hearing, involved HEW's
interpretation of what was in effect introductory language to a
proposed set of regulations. The language provided that a
"[d]etermination of amount of payment in converting from the
Federal-State public assistance programs to SSI is considered to be
part of the initial process of establishing eligibility and amount of
payment."' 59 It was HEW's contention that these "regulations" did
not require a prior opportunity to be heard in cases where a
determination was made that a recipient obtained payments from a
state for which he was ineligible in December 1973.160 Regardless
of the constitutional validity of such an argument, 161 other regula-
155 Id.
156 Id.
1 8 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 462 (1974) (E.D. Pa., filed Sept. 16, 1974).
58 See notes 47-49 and accompanying text supra.
'59 Proposed HEW Reg. § 416, Subpart M, 39 Fed. Reg. 12,028 (1974) (introductory
language).
"' See Lyons v. Weinberger, 376 F. Supp. 248, 259 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Brown v.
Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 1092, 1097 (D. Md. 1974).
18' See notes 59-79 and accompanying text supra.
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tions in effect during 1974 point to an opposite conclusion. For
example, written notice of an initial determination must be mailed
to the affected party and, if the initial determination states that the
party's eligibility for benefits has ended or a reduction is to be
made, such "determination shall state the basis for the determina-
tion and shall provide notice and an opportunity for [an] eviden-
tiary hearing before such determination is effectuated."'16 2 The
regulations further require that "[u]pon receipt of a timely filed
request for reconsideration of such initial determination, the Ad-
ministration shall continue benefits . . . and provide the parties
thereto an opportunity for a formal conference. .... ,,163 in light of
these provisions, the volume of judicial activity that occurred in
1974, centering around the procedural due process rights of con-
verted SSI recipients, was surprisingly large.
One court has recently observed that the entire dispute in this
area easily could have been avoided if Congress, in enacting the
SSI program, had simply made a clean break with all former
categorical programs-i.e., if it had required a new determination
of eligibility to be made for all former aid recipients. 6 4 It
explained that
[h]ad this route been taken by legislative . . . action, a claimant
would [have] encounter[ed] serious difficulties in showing an
entitlement to these due process rights [of notice and a fair
hearing]. But neither the Secretary nor Congress pursued this
avenue, probably because of the recognition that a large number
of the individuals involved would suffer great hardship if they
had to await a determination of their status before the payments
commenced. 16 5
In establishing any new welfare program to replace AFDC,
Congress will again have to balance the hardship likely to be
encountered by former recipients of state assistance, if they are
required to reestablish their eligibility, against the administrative
difficulties involved in grandfathering those individuals into a new
program. Experience gained under SSI should provide the legis-
lators with a better perspective of the consequences likely to ensue
from choosing one alternative over another. Hopefully, this knowl-
edge can be employed to establish a system that is both administra-
162 20 C.F.R. § 416.1404(c), 39 Fed. Reg. 32,983 (1974).
163 Proposed HEW Reg. § 416.1419(a), 39 Fed. Reg. 1055 (1974).
164 Brown v. Weinberger, 382 F. Supp. 1092, 1098 (D. Md. 1974).
165 Id. (emphasis added).
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tively efficient and equitable to those who have come to rely upon a
certain level of assistance to maintain their daily existence. 166
CONCLUSION
The criticism directed against SSI in 1974 has ranged from
miniscule to monumental, but in the final analysis, the program's
basic structure has remained unscathed. Most of the early activity
that did occur centered around administrative abuses of power by
the Secretary of HEW, remedial legislation passed by the Congress,
and the delays associated with the emergence of a new welfare
scheme. When this initial period of turbulence begins to subside,
one can expect to see a more vigorous assault on the premises
underlying many of the substantive provisions of the Act.
Basic reform is urgently needed in the federal government's
remaining family assistance programs. The principles embodied in
SSI can serve as a guide for future reform measures in this area,
and the lessons gleaned from 1974 can be used to avoid many of
the problems likely to be encountered by a program similar in
character and administrative structure.
Peter C. Houtsma
166 See notes 90-91 and accompanying text supra.
